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Torts
by Deron R. Hicks*

and Travis C. Hargrove**
I.

NEGLIGENT HIRING

In Underberg v. Southern Alarm, Inc.,' the Georgia Court of Appeals

reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of a home security
services company and its authorized dealer in a negligent hiring action.2
In November 2001 a dealership for a home security services company
hired Bert Fields to act as a "promotions representative" for the dealer.
As a promotions representative, Fields went door-to-door in residential
neighborhoods selling security systems. Prior to hiring Fields, the dealer
did not perform a background check. Had a background check been
performed, the dealer would have discovered that Fields had been
sentenced to life in prison in 1979 for burglary and kidnapping, and
paroled in 1995. 3
In late 2001, Fields contacted the plaintiff on several occasions at her
home concerning the installation of a home security alarm system. In
addition to at least three efforts by Fields to contact the plaintiff in
person at her home, the dealership's name and telephone number
appeared on the plaintiff's caller identification system on several
occasions. In early February 2002 the plaintiff returned home in the
early afternoon, parked her car in the garage, and entered her house
through an unlocked door. In the process, she left her garage open.
After entering the house, the plaintiff noticed Fields standing in the
*

General Counsel, Home Builders Association of Georgia. Adjunct Professor of Law,

Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law. University of Georgia (B.F.A., 1990);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1993).
** Associate in the firm of Page, Scrantom, Sprouse, Tucker & Ford, P.C., Columbus,
Georgia. Auburn University (B.A., magna cum laude, 2001); Mercer University, Walter F.
George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2004).
1. 284 Ga. App. 108, 643 S.E.2d 374 (2007).
2. Id. at 108, 643 S.E.2d at 375.
3. Id.
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doorway. Fields pulled a gun on the plaintiff and asked her whether she
recognized him. The plaintiff did not recognize Fields until he identified
himself as a salesman for the dealer. Fields bound the plaintiff with
duct tape, placed her in a car, and drove her to South Carolina. Fields
released the plaintiff after she promised to give him six thousand
dollars.4
The plaintiff thereafter brought suit against both the security alarm
dealership and the security alarm services company. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff
appealed.5 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the defendants had a
duty to conduct a background check on Fields, the defendants had
breached that duty, and the breach of that duty was the proximate cause
of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.'
According to the court of appeals, "'The appropriate standard of care
in a negligent hiring/retention action is whether the employer knew or
should have known the employee was not suited for the particular
employment."'" The court of appeals further noted that "a jury could
find that [the dealer] owed a heightened duty to ascertain whether
individuals it hired, even briefly, to enter homes of unsuspecting persons
for the purpose of selling security systems were suited for this purpose."' The court of appeals also noted that whether the dealer owed
the plaintiff a duty to perform a background check and whether it
breached that duty were questions of fact that must be resolved by a
jury.,
Notwithstanding the issues of whether the defendants had a duty to
perform a background check and whether the defendants breached that
duty, the court of appeals still faced the issue of whether a jury could
conclude "that the failure to investigate Fields's background [was] a
proximate cause of [the plaintiff's] abduction." ° The defendants argued
that proximate cause could not be established because Fields's act "was
not committed within the tortfeasor's working hours" and "because
Fields did not use his association with [the dealer and the alarm services
company] as a ruse to gain entry into [the plaintiff's] home on the date
he abducted her."'"

4. Id. at 109-10, 643 S.E.2d at 376-77.
5. Id. at 108, 643 S.E.2d at 375.
6. See id. at 110, 643 S.E.2d at 377.
7. Id. (quoting W. Indus., Inc. v. Poole, 280 Ga. App. 378,381-82, 634 S.E.2d 118, 121
(2006)).
8. Id. at 111, 643 S.E.2d at 377.
9. Id. at 110, 643 S.E.2d at 377.
10. Id. at 112-13, 643 S.E.2d at 378.
11. Id. at 113, 643 S.E.2d at 379.
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The defendants based their argument upon the decision in TGM
Ashley Lakes, Inc. v.Jennings12 in which the Georgia Court of Appeals
held that "'liability does not attach if the employee committed the tort
in a setting or under circumstances wholly unrelated to his employment."'13 The court of appeals in Underberg, however, held that the
defendants' argument constituted "an overly restrictive application of
TGM."' 4 In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals was "persuaded by cases from other jurisdictions that neither the termination of
the employment relationship nor the passage of time break the causal
connection as a matter of law." 5
The court first addressed the defendants' argument that Fields had
not committed the acts at issue during his working hours.16 The court
rejected this argument on the basis that "[c]ircumstantial evidence exists
from which a jury could infer that Fields's contact with [the plaintiff]
was employment-related." 7
In particular, the court noted that
promotions representatives, such as Fields, were encouraged to contact
friends and neighbors outside of working hours to sell security systems. 8 The court concluded that because the plaintiff and Fields
resided in the same town, "the [defendants'] policy empowered him to
contact her."9
The court of appeals also rejected the argument that because Fields
entered the plaintiff's home through an unlocked garage door, instead of
using his position as an employee of the company to gain entry, the
abduction was unrelated to his employment.2" The court of appeals
rejected this argument on the basis that:
"It remains to be seen in the development of the facts whether the
surreptitious entry... was the result of the employment of the felon;
whether the felon's background projected the risk; and whether
defendant[s] had any knowledge of this background or could have
acquired such knowledge. It remains to be determined whether

12. 264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003).
13. Underberg, 284 Ga. App. at 113, 643 S.E.2d at 379 (quoting TGM Ashley Lakes,
Inc., 264 Ga. App. at 459, 590 S.E.2d at 813).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 114-15, 643 S.E.2d at 380.
18. Id. at 115, 643 S.E.2d at 380.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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defendant[s] took the precautions ...reasonable [persons] would be

required to take under the circumstances."2

The decision in Underberg is troubling. On its surface, it would
appear that Fields's employment by a dealer of residential security
systems is in some manner relevant to the court's determination that a
material issue of fact existed that precluded summary judgment.
However, a closer examination of the decision draws this conclusion into
question. The decision makes it clear that Fields did not gain entry into
the plaintiff's home by virtue of his position as an employee or independent contractor of the defendants. That is, the plaintiff did not invite
Fields into her home in his capacity as a promotions representative.
This appears to be the most obvious risk entailed by the defendants'
failure to conduct a background check on a person in that position.
Fields, however, simply knew who the plaintiff was and where the
plaintiff lived. Otherwise, the fact that he sold residential security
systems was irrelevant. Fields could have derived the information
regarding the plaintiff's identity and address by working in any number
of different companies, industries, or capacities.
The decision in Underberg raises the issue of whether the duty to
conduct background checks of employees has now been expanded to
include employees in positions previously unconsidered. That is, does
the decision in Underberg establish a duty to perform a background
check on any employee who may have access to a customer's identity and
address?

II.

PREMISES LIABILITY

In McAfee v.ETS Payphones, Inc.,2 the Georgia Court of Appeals

affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a premises
liability action arising from injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result
of criminal damage to a payphone. 23 The defendant, ETS Payphones,
owned approximately 2500 payphones in Georgia. In late 2003 ETS
Payphones experienced an increase in incidents of theft from their
payphones.2 4 Apparently, the thieves stole money from the payphones
"by drilling out the payphone's locks, which would loosen the phone's25
casing from its base but would leave the phone fully functioning."

21. Id. (brackets in original) (alterations in original) (quoting McGuire v. Ariz. Prot.
Agency, 609 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Ariz. 1980)).
22. 283 Ga. App. 756, 642 S.E.2d 422 (2007).
23. Id. at 756, 642 S.E.2d at 423.
24. Id. at 756-57, 642 S.E.2d at 424.
25. Id. at 757, 642 S.E.2d at 424.
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Under those circumstances, the only way that ETS Payphones could
determine that a phone had been subjected to theft or other tampering
was to physically inspect the phone.26
On July 22, 2004, the plaintiff stopped at a gas station to use one of
the defendant's payphones.2 7 Although the payphone was functioning,
"the phone's lock had been drilled and its cast-metal casing had been
loosened from its base as a result of a theft." 2' During the course of
making his phone call, the plaintiff knelt on the ground to prevent the
wind from blowing away his paperwork. As he did so, the upper casing
of the payphone fell on the plaintiff's head. 29 The plaintiff filed a
negligence action against ETS Payphones and alleged that the defendant
failed "to exercise ordinary care to protect him from the hidden danger
posed by its theft-damaged payphone."3° ETS Payphones moved for
summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. 3' The
plaintiff appealed, "arguing that genuine issues of material fact exist[ed]
as to whether ETS had superior knowledge of the danger posed by its
damaged payphone and as to whether it exercised ordinary care to
protect invitees from such danger."3 2 The court of appeals disagreed
and affirmed the trial court's decision.33
In affirming the trial court's decision, the court of appeals noted that
"'[tihe true basis of a proprietor's liability for personal injury to an
invitee is the proprietor's superior knowledge of a condition that may
expose the invitees to an unreasonable risk of harm.' "3 Moreover, the
owner of a premises can only be liable for a third-party criminal act if
the crime is foreseeable and the owner fails to take steps to guard
against injury. 35 The court further held, however, that "'[iun order for
the crime at issue to be foreseeable, it must be substantially similar to
previous criminal activities occurring on or near the premises such that
a reasonable person would take ordinary precautions to protect invitees

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
Smith,
35.
S.E.2d

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 758, 642 S.E.2d at 424 (emphasis added by court) (quoting Emory Univ. v.
260 Ga. App. 900, 901, 581 S.E.2d 405, 406 (2003)).
Id., 642 S.E.2d at 425 (quoting TGM Ashley Lakes, Inc., 264 Ga. App. at 462, 590
at 816).
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from the risk posed by the criminal activity. '3,6 The court of appeals
observed that no evidence suggested ETS Payphones had actual
knowledge of the danger posed by the specific payphone that injured the
plaintiff or the danger posed to other customers because of damage
caused during a theft."
Accordingly, the issue was whether ETS Payphones possessed
constructive knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition.3" The
plaintiff argued that ETS Payphones
had constructive knowledge based on its being aware of the fact that
a recently terminated employee was stealing the money from its payphones and, in the course of such thefts, was damaging the phones in
a manner similar to the damage sustained by the phone that caused
[the plaintiff's] injury."
The court of appeals, however, concluded that ETS Payphones did not
have a duty to "'foresee dangers which are not reasonably expected."'4 °
On this basis, the court of appeals held that ETS Payphones could not
"reasonably foresee that the theft damage of its payphone would cause
injury to [the plaintiff] and in particular that [the plaintiff] would be
kneeling on the ground and pulling on the phone cord such that the
phone would fall on his head."4 1
III.

DRAM SHOP ACT

Pierce,4 2

In Becks v.
the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the denial
of summary judgment to the defendant, the owner of a bar, in an action
filed under Georgia's Dram Shop Act43 because the plaintiff failed to
produce any evidence that the defendant or its employees knew that an
intoxicated customer would soon be driving." Jeffery Fleming arrived
at the defendant's bar at some point between 9:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.
on April 12, 2002. Fleming, who was not a regular patron of the
defendant's bar, stayed at the bar for approximately five to five and a

36. Id. (quoting Agnes Scott Coll., Inc. v. Clark, 273 Ga. App. 619,621, 616 S.E.2d 468,
470 (2005)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Yager v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 257 Ga. App. 215,217,570 S.E.2d 650,
651 (2002)).
41. Id. at 759, 642 S.E.2d at 425.
42. 282 Ga. App. 229, 638 S.E.2d 390 (2006).
43. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (2000).
44. Becks, 282 Ga. App. at 235, 638 S.E.2d at 394.
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half hours.4 5 During that time, Fleming drank two or three mixed
drinks and two cups of beer. Fleming left the bar at around 3:30 a.m.
When leaving the bar, Fleming walked past a security guard and two
police officers employed by the bar. According to Fleming, he did not
have a drink for an hour prior to leaving the bar. While driving home,
Fleming fell asleep in his vehicle, which crossed the median and struck
the plaintiff's oncoming vehicle. The plaintiff thereafter brought suit
against the owner of the bar, alleging 4the
owner was liable for her
6
injuries under Georgia's Dram Shop Act.
The trial court denied the owner's motion for summary judgment,
ruling that genuine issues of material fact "remained as to whether
Fleming was noticeably intoxicated when he was served his last drink
[and] whether based on the training given to the Bar's employees, [the
owner] should have known that Fleming would soon be driving."4 7 The
owner appealed.4" On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that summary judgment should have been entered in favor of
the defendant.4 9
Under Georgia's Dram Shop Act,
[A] person who ... knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic
beverages to a person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication,
knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, may
become liable for injury or damage caused by or resulting from the
intoxication of such ... person when the sale, furnishing, or serving is
the proximate cause of such injury or damage.5"
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying
his motion for summary judgment because "there was no evidence that
the Bar knew that Fleming would soon be driving."51
According to the court of appeals,
It is a long-standing rule that the [Dram Shop] Act does not require
that the person selling, furnishing, or serving alcohol have actual
knowledge that the patron was soon to drive. "Rather, if a provider in
the exercise of reasonable care should have known both that the
recipient of the alcohol was noticeably intoxicated and that the

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 229, 638 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 229-30, 638 S.E.2d at 391.
Id. at 232, 638 S.E.2d at 392.
Id. at 229, 638 S.E.2d at 390.
Id. at 235, 638 S.E.2d at 394.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b).
Becks, 282 Ga. App. at 233, 638 S.E.2d at 393.
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recipient would be driving soon, the provider will be deemed to have
knowledge of that fact."52
The court concluded that no evidence in the record established that any
employee of the bar knew Fleming would soon be driving when he was
served his last drink. 3 To the contrary, according to the court, the
record showed that "there was no evidence that Fleming displayed his
keys at any time or otherwise did anything to indicate that he might be
Bar
driving. Furthermore, Fleming was not a regular customer of the
54
such that the employees would know that he would be driving."
The court of appeals rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
defendant's employees knew or should have known that Fleming
intended to drive because he walked by three bar employees when he left
the bar.5 The court of appeals held that "Fleming's intention at that
time ... [was] not the relevant inquiry under the statute. Rather, the
statute requires that the person serving the last drink know that the
patron is soon to drive."56
The court of appeals also rejected the plaintiff's argument that because
most customers drive to the bar, the bar should have known that
Based on the
Fleming would drive after leaving the building. 7
supreme court's decision in Sugarloaf Cafg, Inc. v. Willbanks," the
court of appeals held that evidence that a bar is located in a "'remote'
location and that most customers drive to the server's place of business
is insufficient to show that the server knew a customer would soon be
driving."59
IV. LIABILITY FOR INJURY BY DOMESTICATED ANIMAL
In Burns v. Leap,6" the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a property
owner was not liable for injuries sustained by a visitor who was knocked
down by a horse boarded by the owner. 6 ' In November 2002 the
plaintiff approached the defendant property owner about purchasing the

52. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Baxley v. Hakiel Indus., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 94, 95,
633 S.E.2d 360, 362 (2006)).
53. Id. at 234, 638 S.E.2d at 394.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 279 Ga. 255, 612 S.E.2d 279 (2005).
59. Becks, 282 Ga. App. at 235, 638 S.E.2d at 394 (quoting SugarloafCafg, Inc., 279 Ga.
at 257, 612 S.E.2d at 281).
60. 285 Ga. App. 307, 645 S.E.2d 751 (2007).
61. Id. at 307, 645 S.E.2d at 751.
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defendant's property.2 The defendant's property included "a seven-acre
63
In
tract with a main house, a guest house, paddocks, and a barn."
64
addition, the defendant boarded four horses on her property.
On November 29, 2002, the plaintiff and her family toured the
defendant's property. The tour included a visit to the pasture where the
four horses boarded by the defendant were located. To gain access to the
pasture, the defendant and the plaintiff's family first went through a
gate near the barn that led to a horse run.6 5 The plaintiff, "who was
the last person through the initial gate, failed to close it. After crossing
the horse run, the group passed through an open gate that led into the
pasture, leaving the gate ajar."66 After the plaintiff and her family
petted the horses, the defendant asked the plaintiff whether she had
closed the initial gate. The plaintiff replied that she had not, but offered
to do so. As the plaintiff left to close the first gate, a horse ran toward
her and knocked her into a barbed wire fence.67
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant and claimed that the
defendant "was negligent in failing to ensure that the gates were closed,
asking [the plaintiff] to close the gate, . . . and failing to warn [the
plaintiff] of the dangers in the pasture."6" The defendant filed a motion
for summary judgment and argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff "failed
69
to produce evidence of the horse's vicious propensity." In support of
her motion for summary judgment, the defendant submitted an affidavit
in which she stated that she had boarded the horse for a number of
years and had never observed any vicious propensity on the part of the
horse. 7' The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, and the plaintiff appealed.7 On appeal, the court of appeals
affirmed the grant of summary judgment.72
According to the court of appeals, "To prevail on a claim for damages
for injuries caused by a horse, 'it is necessary to show that the horse was
' 73
As no
vicious and that the owner had knowledge of that fact. "'

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
S.E.2d

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307-08, 645 S.E.2d at 751-52.
Id. at 308, 645 S.E.2d at 752.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 307, 645 S.E.2d at 751.
Id.
Id. at 309, 645 S.E.2d at 752 (quoting McNish v. Gilbert, 184 Ga. App. 234, 235, 361
231, 233 (1987)).
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evidence suggested any vicious propensity of the horse, the court of
appeals held that the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment to the defendant.7 4
The plaintiff, however, argued that the decision in Callaway v.
Miller71 permitted the plaintiff to "pursue a negligence claim, notwithstanding the lack of any evidence that [the defendant] had knowledge of
the horse's dangerous propensities."76 The court of appeals acknowledged that the decision in Callaway did, in fact, hold that Official Code
of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 51-2-7, 77 the dangerous
animal statute, "does not provide 'an exclusive basis for recovery when
injury is caused by a domestic animal.'7, 8 However, the court of
appeals further noted that the decision79 in Callaway "is physical
precedent only and therefore not binding."
V.

DEFAMATION

In Bellemeade, LLC v. Stoker, ° Bellemeade, LLC, Stoker Group, and
Jerry Stoker entered into multiple partnerships in connection with the
development of several residential properties. At some point, the parties
decided to terminate the business relationship and dissolve the
partnership; however, they were unable to do so in a mutually agreeable
fashion and had to resort to litigation. The suit consisted of multiple
claims by Bellemeade and its principals against Stoker Group and its
principals for unjust enrichment, breach of oral contract, and breach of
fiduciary duties."s
During the pendency of the litigation, Jerry Stoker amended his
complaint against Edward Faircloth (one of the principals of Bellemeade
and a party to the litigation) to assert a claim for slander. However,
because the amended complaint failed to state Stoker's special damages

74. Id.
75. 118 Ga. App. 309, 163 S.E.2d 336 (1968).
76. Burns, 285 Ga. App. at 309, 645 S.E.2d at 752.
77. O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (2000).
78. Burns, 285 Ga. App at 309, 645 S.E.2d at 753 (quoting Callaway, 118 Ga. App. at
311, 163 S.E.2d at 338).
79. Id.
80. 280 Ga. 635, 631 S.E.2d 693 (2006).
81. Id. at 635-36, 631 S.E.2d at 694. Certiorari was not granted on these additional
claims; rather, the Georgia Supreme Court only granted certiorari with respect to the court
of appeals order affirming the denial of summary judgment with respect to the slander
claim. Id.
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with particularity, as required by O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9(g),8 2 the court
could only treat the claim as one for slander per se. 3
The slander claim against Faircloth arose several months after the
parties filed the lawsuit. In that claim, Stoker alleged that Faircloth
approached Charles Gross, a friend of Stoker for some time, and
purchased numerous real estate lots for development through his
connection with Stoker. When Faircloth inquired with Gross about
purchasing certain real estate lots from him, Gross told Faircloth that
if Gross purchased any lots, it would be through Stoker. 4 In response,
Faircloth allegedly told Gross, "'Jerry isn't going to be selling lots here
in Warner Robins much longer. He probably is going back to Valdosta,
so if you want to buy these lots, you need to sign a contract with me."'8 5
Faircloth denied making this remark and moved for summary judgment
on the basis that even if he made the statement, the plaintiff could not
hold him liable for it because it was a statement of opinion regarding a
future event.8 6
The trial court denied Faircloth's motion, and the Georgia Court of
Appeals affirmed the denial.8 7 The court of appeals determined that
based on Faircloth's statement, a viable claim of slander per se existed
because "'the statements at issue could reasonably be interpreted as
having the purpose of injuring Stoker's business by stating or implying
that Stoker was going out of the development business in which he was
the area, and that these assertions are capable
still engaged and leaving
88
of being proved false.'
In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals observed that courts
determine whether a statement is slander by looking to "'the plain
import of the words spoken'" without resorting to innuendo. 9 The
court of appeals further explained that the "'pivotal questions are
whether the statements can reasonably be interpreted as stating or
implying defamatory facts about [the] plaintiff and, if so, whether the
°
The
defamatory assertions are capable of being proved false."'9

82. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9(g) (2006).
83. Bellemeade, LLC, 280 Ga. at 636, 631 S.E.2d at 694 (citing McGee v. Gast, 257 Ga.
App. 882, 885, 572 S.E.2d 398, 401 (2002)).
84. Id., 631 S.E.2d at 694-95.
85. Id., 631 S.E.2d at 695.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 637, 631 S.E.2d at 695 (quoting Stoker v. Bellemeade, LLC, 272 Ga. App. 817,
827, 615 S.E.2d 1, 11 (2005)).
89. Id. at 636, 631 S.E.2d at 695 (quoting Stoker, 272 Ga. App. at 827, 615 S.E.2d at
11).
90. Id. (quoting Stoker, 272 Ga. App. at 827, 615 S.E.2d at 11).
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Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether this test
was1 proper for determining whether statements constituted slander per
se.

9

The supreme court noted that slander per se consists of "'[miaking
charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession,
calculated to injure him therein ' and that damages need not be
proved for such statements because damage is inferred.93 The supreme
court reiterated the court of appeals observations about slander and
noted that to determine whether a statement constitutes slander per se,
a court looks to "'the plain import of the words spoken"' 94 that are
"'injurious on their face-without the aid of extrinsic proof."' 95 The
supreme court further explained that a court is not to "'hunt for a
strained construction' ' 96 and that any "inference a hearer might take
from the words does not subject the speaker to liability for slander per
se."97 In other words, as the supreme court noted, if the words are
defamatory on their face, no innuendo or explanation is required. 9
The Georgia Supreme Court next addressed the test applied by the
court of appeals in determining whether the statements in question
constituted slander per se.9 9 The supreme court noted that the "pivotal
questions" do not determine whether a statement constitutes slander per
se.' 00 On the contrary, according to the supreme court, the pivotal
questions aid in determining whether a statement constitutes defamation when the speaker claims it is a nonactionable opinion.' °' With
respect to alleged opinions, no constitutional privilege exists for such
statements; rather, a court must determine whether the alleged opinion
can be interpreted as reasonably implying defamatory facts about the

91. Id. at 637, 631 S.E.2d at 695.
92. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4(a)(3) (2000)).
93. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-5-4(b)).
94. Id. (quoting Palombi v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 241 Ga. App. 154, 156, 526 S.E.2d 375, 378
(1999)).
95. Id. (quoting Macon Tel. Publ'g Co. v. Elliott, 165 Ga. App. 719, 723, 302 S.E.2d
692, 696 (1983)).
96. Id. (quoting Webster v. Wilkins, 217 Ga. App. 194, 195, 456 S.E.2d 699, 701
(1995)).
97. Id. at 637-38, 631 S.E.2d at 695 (citing Palombi, 241 Ga. App. at 156, 526 S.E.2d
at 377).
98. Id. at 638, 631 S.E.2d 695-96.
99. Id., 631 S.E.2d at 696.
100. Id. (citing Gast v. Brittain, 277 Ga. 340, 340-41, 589 S.E.2d 63, 64 (2003)).
101. Id. (citing Gast, 277 Ga. at 340-41, 589 S.E.2d at 64).
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plaintiff
and, if so, whether the assertions are capable of being proved
102
false.
In reversing the denial of Faircloth's motion for summary judgment,
the supreme court concluded that the court of appeals in this case, and
in other cases, erred by applying the Milkovich factors to determine
whether statements constituted slander per se.' ° Although Faircloth
asserted the "opinion defense," the court held that the "employment of
the Milkovich factors determines only that the alleged opinion is
actionable as slander."0 4 The supreme court further held that these
factors have no bearing on whether the statements constitute slander
per se and that the court of appeals erred by including such factors in
its determination of whether the statements constituted slander per
se. 05 Faircloth's words were not injurious on their face and did not,
on their face, "cast aspersions on Stoker's reputation because of the
1 6
particular demands or qualifications of his profession.""
Therefore,
°7
the court granted summary judgment to Faircloth.
The decision in Bellemeade establishes that when determining whether
a statement constitutes slander per se, a court must solely look at the
108
statement without resorting to any extraneous evidence or innuendo.
The decision also establishes the importance of careful drafting of
pleadings.'0 9 Had Stoker alleged special damages as required, his
claim would not have been limited to one for slander per se. °
Further, his complaint may not have been susceptible to summary
judgment because extrinsic facts may be used to establish the defamatory character of words in a case based on slander rather than slander per
11
se. 1
VI.

EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

In Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Mosley," 2 the
Georgia Court of Appeals considered the potential liability of an

102.
factors
103.
Smith,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-21 (1990)). These
are commonly referred to as the "Milkovich factors." Id.
Id. (citing Lippy v. Benson, 276 Ga. App. 50, 622 S.E.2d 385 (2005); Holsapple v.
267 Ga. App. 17, 599 S.E.2d 28 (2004)).
Id. at 639, 631 S.E.2d at 696.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638-39, 631 S.E.2d at 696.
See id. at 636, 631 S.E.2d at 694.
See id.
Id. at 637, 631 S.E.2d at 695.
280 Ga. App. 486, 634 S.E.2d 466 (2006).
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employer for the alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress upon
an employee by her supervisor." 3 Mosley, the plaintiff, sued the
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority ("MARTA") based on the
alleged conduct of her supervisor, Richards.
Richards supervised
approximately six hundred bus operators including Mosley. Prior to the
incident in question, Mosley had only come into contact with Richards
twice. Mosley alleged that as she entered the dispatch office, Richards
reached out as if to shake her hand.1 4 Richards allegedly grabbed her
hand and "spun her toward him so that her backside was compressed
against the front of his body, rubbed his hand along her side between
her waist and underarm, squeezed her waist, moaned and then
smiled."" 5 The incident lasted approximately two seconds."'
The day after the alleged incident, Mosley filed a complaint with
MARTA's Office of Equal Opportunity Employment on the basis that
Richards sexually harassed and assaulted her. MARTA determined that
Richards had acted improperly despite his denial of all allegations.
Richards only admitted to trying to hug Mosley. Accordingly, MARTA
disciplined Richards by requiring or recommending certain corrective
actions. 17
As a result of the incident, Mosley brought an action against MARTA
and Richards for actual and punitive damages based upon the alleged
improper touch by Richards. In the complaint, she asserted claims of:
(1) battery against Richards; (2) negligent and wrongful retention and
failure to provide a safe work environment against MARTA; and (3)
intentional infliction of emotional distress against both defendants."'
Both defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The trial
court denied all the defendants' motions for summary judgment." 9
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of all motions for summary
judgment except for the claims of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and failure to provide a safe work environment. 20
In reversing the trial court's denial of the defendants' motions for
summary judgment regarding the claim for intentional infliction of
21
emotional distress, the court noted the plaintiff's stringent burden.'

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
through
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 486-87, 634 S.E.2d at 467.
Id., 634 S.E.2d at 467-68.

Id.
Id. at 487, 634 S.E.2d at 468.
Id. Richards complied with all of MARTA's orders but did not seek counseling
MARTA's employee assistance program as recommended by MARTA. Id.
Id. at 486-87, 634 S.E.2d at 467.
Id. at 487, 634 S.E.2d at 467.
Id.
Id. at 490, 634 S.E.2d at 470.
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To meet the burden, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the conduct complained of was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (3) there is a causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the plaintiff's emotional distress; and (4) the emotional
distress is severe.122 To satisfy the third element, the conduct must

"'go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and ... be regarded as
'123

atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'
According to the court, an employer-employee relationship may
produce a character of outrageousness that might not otherwise
exist. 124 However, the court further explained that the tort requires
"'major outrage in the .. .conduct.'' 25 In this case, the court did not
deem the conduct reprehensible enough to survive summary judgment
because "it was an isolated instance that lasted
two seconds, occurred in
26
public, and was not physically threatening."

Interestingly, the court found persuasive a federal court's holding that
a claim similar to Mosley's sexual harassment claim did not survive
summary judgment because the conduct was not "sufficiently severe or
pervasive [enough] to constitute a hostile or abusive work environment." 27 The court noted that the federal standard for a sexual
harassment claim is lower than the "outrageous"
conduct standard for
12
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Mosley is an intriguing case because, construing the facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, one could certainly argue that the
conduct complained of was indeed reprehensible. Those defending cases
involving intentional infliction of emotional distress will find this case
useful. Taking the facts stated by the plaintiff as true, the plaintiff was
subjected to inappropriate conduct which, although short in duration,
most people would likely find appalling.
In Lockhart v. Marine Manufacturing Corp.,129 the plaintiff brought
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his former

122. Id. at 490-91, 634 S.E.2d at 470 (citing Mangrum v. Republic Indus., 260 F. Supp.
2d 1229, 1256 (N.D. Ga. 2003)).
123. Id. at 491, 634 S.E.2d at 470 (quoting Mangrum, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 1256)
(applying Georgia law).
124. Id. (citing Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 230, 335 S.E.2d
445, 448 (1985)).
125. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bridges, 176 Ga. App. at 230, 335 S.E.2d at
448).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 492 n.7, 634 S.E.2d at 470 n.7 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982)).
128. Id. (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-04).
129. 281 Ga. App. 145, 635 S.E.2d 405 (2006).
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employer based on four incidents of racist-laden and insulting comments
directed at him by other employees, including supervisors.
The
comments included statements made by Caucasian employees to the
plaintiff, an African-American.13 ° First, his supervisor stated that he
would "'have the [Ku Klux] Klan burn a cross in [the plaintiff's]
yard."' 13 ' Second, a coworker made the following comment: "'[Y]ou
can't pay for that [motor] with food stamps.'"'32 The third comment
was made by the plant manager, who was displeased with the speed of
the plaintiff's work: "'I ain't your m - f__ nigger. I ain't going to be
doing your m_
f
work for you.'"'33
As a result of this third comment, the plaintiff quit his job, but later
returned after the plant manager visited his home to apologize. 3 4 The
final comment occurred shortly after the plaintiff returned to work when
a supervisor saw the plaintiff with a boat he owned and said the
35
plaintiff was "'buying a lot of stuff ... [and] must be selling drugs."1
The plaintiff brought this action after being terminated from his job
for fist fighting with another employee. During his employment,
he
13
never complained about the statements to upper management.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case,
finding that the comments did not amount to extreme and outrageous
conduct, a determination that is a question of law. 137 The court of
appeals agreed, applying the principle of law that comments made in the
employment context "'may be horrifying or traumatizing,"' but they are
generally considered part of normal life, and plaintiffs are expected to be
hardened to certain language.'38
The court of appeals identified several factors that precluded it from
holding that the comments were beyond the bounds of decency or
egregious or outrageous enough to justifiably result in severe fright,
humiliation, embarrassment, or outrage beyond what any reasonable
person is expected to endure. 139 The court noted that only four
comments were made in a fourteen-month employment period, and only

130. Id. at 145-46, 635 S.E.2d at 406.
131. Id.
132. Id. (brackets in original).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 147, 635 S.E.2d at 407.
138. Id. (quoting Jarrard v. United Parcel Serv., 242 Ga. App. 58, 59, 529 S.E.2d 144,
147 (2000)).
139. Id.
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three of these comments related to the plaintiff's job performance.14 °
Further, the plaintiff admitted that he never filed a complaint with the
management of the company regarding these comments.141 After the
most egregious comments, the supervisor apologized, and the plaintiff
returned to work. 142 Finally, the court noted that one single person
did not make the comments "in a systematic effort to belittle and abuse
[the plaintiff].",4

Rather, different people made isolated comments

44
over a lengthy period of time.
The court of appeals distinguished the case at bar from Coleman v.
Housing Authority of Americus, 4 5 in which a supervisor engaged in a
concentrated campaign of sexual harassment over a three-year uninterrupted period. 146 In that case, the supervisor proffered pornographic
videos and cartoons to the plaintiff, inquired into the plaintiff's marital
relations, and barraged
her with uninterrupted abusive, obscene, racist,
47

and sexual jokes. 1

Lockhart is an interesting case because, although there was not a
campaign of repeated comments, it is indisputable that the third
instance of verbal abuse towards the plaintiff was extremely inappropriate. In the employment context, the decision in Lockhart will make
summary judgment far more likely for a defendant in an intentional
infliction of emotional distress case if the verbal abuse is infrequent,
followed by an apology from the defendant's employee, or both, even if
the verbal abuse is in extremely poor taste, racist-laden, and reprehensible. For plaintiffs, the decision in Lockhart will make it difficult to
successfully pursue an intentional infliction of emotional distress case
against an employer based on a few comments, even if egregious.
VII.

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Wright,"*

In Allen v.
Ernestine Wright filed a medical malpractice
action against Dr. Thomas Allen.' 49 In an attempt to comply with

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
at 166,
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147-48, 281 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 148, 281 S.E.2d at 407.
191 Ga. App. 166, 381 S.E.2d 303 (1989).
Lockhart, 281 Ga. App. at 148, 635 S.E.2d at 408 (citing Coleman, 191 Ga. App.
381 S.E.2d at 304).
Coleman, 191 Ga. App. at 168, 381 S.E.2d at 305.
282 Ga. 9, 644 S.E.2d 814 (2007).
Id. at 9, 644 S.E.2d at 815.
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O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2,15° Wright executed an authorization to
release her medical records and filed the authorization with her
complaint. Allen moved to dismiss the complaint. He alleged that
Wright failed to comply with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2 for several
reasons, including the medical release's failure to authorize defense
attorneys to communicate with Wright's treating physicians without the
presence or notification of the plaintiff's lawyer, even though the statute
does not require such actions.1"'
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, asserting that the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") of 19962 preempted O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2. The Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's ruling, citing to its decision in Northlake
Medical Center,LLC v. Queen,"3 in which the court held that HIPAA
preempted O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2.15 The Georgia Supreme Court
granted certiorari because the defendants in Northlake Medical Center
did not seek certiorari and because this was an issue of first impression
for the court.5 5
The court first noted that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2(a) requires any
plaintiff who files a medical malpractice complaint to file a medical

150. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (2006). The relevant portion of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2
provides:
(a) In any action for damages alleging medical malpractice .. , contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff shall be required to file a
medical authorization form. Failure to provide this authorization shall subject the
complaint to dismissal.
(b) The authorization shall provide that the attorney representing the defendant is authorized to obtain and disclose protected health information contained
in medical records to facilitate the investigation, evaluation, and defense of the
claims and allegations set forth in the complaint which pertain to the plaintiff or,
where applicable, the plaintiffs decedent whose treatment is at issue in the
complaint. This authorization includes the defendant's attorney's right to discuss
the care and treatment of the plaintiff or, where applicable, the plaintiffs decedent
with all of the plaintiffs or decedent's treating physicians.
(c) The authorization shall provide for the release of all protected health
information except information that is considered privileged and shall authorize
the release of such information by any physician or health care facility by which
health care records of the plaintiff or the plaintiffs decedent would be maintained.

Id.
151. Allen, 282 Ga. at 9-10, 644 S.E.2d at 815.
152. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, 42 U.S.C.).
153. 280 Ga. App. 510, 634 S.E.2d 486 (2006).
154. Allen, 282 Ga. at 10, 644 S.E.2d at 815; see Northlake Med. Ctr., 280 Ga. App. at
513, 634 S.E.2d at 490.
155. Allen, 282 Ga. at 10, 644 S.E.2d at 815.
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authorization contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint.'5 6
Then the court stated that the Georgia General Assembly could have
provided that the authorization must comply with HIPAA, but it did
not. 5 7 Specifically, the court noted that to comply with HIPAA, a
patient's authorization to disclose medical information must contain
many elements, including the right to revoke the authorization.'
The
court further explained that O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2 requires the
authorization to contain a notice of revocation provision. 59 The
defendant argued that this was immaterial because a plaintiff may
60
always dismiss a complaint and thereby revoke the authorization.
The court held that this logic was flawed. 6 1 The court stated that
HIPAA "does not recognize that the right to dismiss a lawsuit in which
the submission of an authorization is a prerequisite is the functional
equivalent of informing [a] patient of his or her right to revoke the
authorization." 1 2 Accordingly, the
court held that the statute did not
63
sufficiently comply with HIPAA.'
With this in mind, the court addressed whether HIPAA preempted the
statute because the statute failed to include a notice of revocation
provision."
A relevant exception to HIPAA permits a state law to
conflict with HIPAA if "the state law relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health information and is 'more stringent' than HIPAA's
requirements." 1 5 The court determined that it was impossible for the
statute to be more stringent than HIPAA when it failed to satisfy
HIPAA's requirement of notice of the right to revoke.'
Therefore, the
statute was preempted by federal law.6 7
The court also held that HIPAA preempted the statute because the
statute failed to require a specific and meaningful identification of the
information to be disclosed and failed to provide an expiration date or a
sufficient expiration condition.'
Therefore, the court denied the

156. Id. at 11, 644 S.E.2d at 816.
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Northlake Med. Ctr., 280 Ga. at 512-13, 634 S.E.2d at 489).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 12, 644 S.E.2d at 816.
163. Id.
164. Id.

165. Id. (quoting Low v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 708-09 (D. Md. 2004)).
166. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 816-17.
167. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 817.
168. Id. at 13, 644 S.E.2d at 817 (citingNorthlake Med. Ctr., 280 Ga. at 514,634 S.E.2d
at 590).
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defendant's motion to dismiss and ruled that because HIPAA preempts
the statute, the plaintiff did not have to comply with the terms of
O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.2 when she filed a medical malpractice ac169
tion.
Further, despite the principle that statutes are read to be valid
whenever possible, the court observed the canon of statutory construction which provides that the express mention of one thing in a statute
implies the exclusion of all other things.17 ° In this case, the statute
included certain things but did not include other items, such as notice
of right to revoke and the like, which HIPAA requires. 1 ' Quite
simply, the statute did not include the HIPAA requirements, and it is
the place of the General Assembly and72 not the courts to revise the
statute so that it complies with HIPAA.
Justice Hunstein concurred in the judgment with respect to the court's
holding that HIPAA preempts the provision of the statute that requires
a plaintiff to release all of his or her medical information in cases
alleging medical malpractice.' 73 However, Justice Hunstein was the
lone dissenting justice in disagreeing that HIPAA preempted all of the
other provisions of the statute. 74 Justice Hunstein read the statutory
language consistently with HIPAA and contended that the mere absence
of items in the statute does not prohibit their inclusion. 17 Justice
Hunstein noted that an authorization that complies with both the
statute and HIPAA could be drafted. 76 Accordingly, Justice Hunstein
would hold that HIPAA only preempts subsection (c) of O.C.G.A. section
9-11-9.2, the provision requiring that a plaintiff release all his medical
information, because that provision requires disclosure of information in
excess of that allowed by HIPAA.177 Justice Hunstein argued that
subsection (c) of the statute should
be severed, and the remainder of the
7
statute should remain valid. 1
Given the General Assembly's recent trend toward passing protectionist measures for the medical profession under the general banner of tort

169. See id. at 14, 644 S.E.2d at 818.
170. Id. at 13-14, 644 S.E.2d at 817 (citing Alexander Props. Group Inc. v. Doe, 280 Ga.
306, 309, 626 S.E.2d 497, 500 (2006)).
171. Id. at 13, 644 S.E.2d at 817.
172. Id. at 14, 644 S.E.2d at 818.
173. Id. at 14-15, 644 S.E.2d at 818 (Hunstein, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
174. Id. at 15, 644 S.E.2d at 818.
175. Id. at 16-17, 644 S.E.2d at 819.
176. Id. at 16, 644 S.E.2d at 819.
177. Id. at 19, 644 S.E.2d at 821.
178. Id. at 19-20, 644 S.E.2d at 821.
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reform, it is likely that the general assembly will take swift action to
bring O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2 into compliance with HIPAA. Doing so
would require plaintiffs to file a medical record authorization simultaneously with the filing of the complaint. In the interim, defense counsel
should be aware that for any cases filed prior to the legislature's further
action, defense lawyers must obtain authorizations for medical records
through traditional means in existence prior to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.2.
Thus, counsel should not file motions to dismiss using O.C.G.A. section
9-11-9.2 as the basis.
In Scott v. Martin,'79 Martin filed a suit against Scott for medical
malpractice but failed to attach an expert affidavit to the complaint."' 0
Relying on the former version of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b),18 1 Martin
moved for an extension to file the expert affidavit, which the
trial court
82
review.'
immediate
of
certificate
a
obtained
Scott
granted.
Martin filed a lawsuit based on Scott's treatment of fractures Martin
received in an accident that occurred on January 26, 2003. Scott
performed surgery on Martin on January 30, 2003, to pin one of the
injured bones. Martin alleged that Scott negligently performed the
surgery and ordered Martin to undergo overly aggressive therapy."'
Prior to the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations, the
8 4
parties entered into settlement negotiations."
On January 13, 2005,
near the end of the limitations period, Scott wrote a letter to Martin that
said he "'[gave] permission to extend the statute of limitations ... for an
additional thirty days in order to give us adequate time to resolve this
issue.' 1 8 ' The parties agreed that this letter extended the statute of
limitations to March 1, 2005.186
On February 16, 2005, Governor Perdue signed into law Georgia Laws
Act 1 (Senate Bill 3).187 In relevant part, the Act amended the former
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b), 88 which allowed plaintiff a forty-five day
grace period within which to file an expert affidavit, plus additional
extensions for "good cause" shown, when the relevant statute of
limitations would expire within ten days of the filing of the com-

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

280 Ga. App. 311, 633 S.E.2d 665 (2006).
Id. at 311, 633 S.E.2d at 665.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b) (2006).
Scott, 280 Ga. App. at 311, 633 S.E.2d at 665.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 312, 633 S.E.2d at 665; 2005 Ga. Laws 1.
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1(b) (1993 & Supp. 2004) (amended 2005).
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plaint.1 8 9 Pursuant to the new legislation, the revisions to O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1(b) would become effective upon approval by Governor
Perdue.' 9o
Martin filed the lawsuit on March 1, 2005, after settlement negotiations broke down and after the revisions to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1(b)
went into effect. However, Martin did not file an expert affidavit with
the complaint because Martin attempted to rely on the former O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1(b), which allowed for the forty-five day grace period.
Scott pleaded this failure as an affirmative defense. 9 '
On March 21, 2005, Martin again relied on the former O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1(b) and filed a motion in the trial court for an additional
thirty days to file the expert affidavit. The trial court granted Martin's
motion because the court interpreted the tolling agreement executed by
Scott to toll not only the statute of limitations but also any changes or

revisions to O.C.G.A. section

9-11-9.1.192

The court of appeals reversed the trial court's order granting the
extension of time to file the expert affidavit. 193 The court held that the
amended statute applied, which requires the plaintiff to file the expert
affidavit simultaneously with the complaint, and unless a statutory
exception applies, failure to do so subjects the complaint to dismissal for
failure to state a claim. 194 According to the court, the revised O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1 provides no such exception and clearly revokes both the
forty-five day grace period and extensions for good cause.19 5 Additionally, the court of appeals held that the tolling agreement, contrary to the
trial court's conclusion, did not toll any changes or revisions to O.C.G.A.
section 9-11-9.1.19"
The court noted that the agreement did not
reference O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 or the filing of the expert affidavit
and only stated that it extended the statute of limitations. 9' Thus,
the court of appeals determined that "the trial court interpreted the
tolling agreement in an overly broad manner."1'
Accordingly, the

189. Id.; Scott, 280 Ga. App. at 312, 633 S.E.2d at 665-66.
190. Scott, 280 Ga. App. at 312, 633 S.E.2d at 666 (citing 2005 Ga. Laws 1, § 15).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 313, 633 S.E.2d at 666.
193. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 667.
194. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 666 (citing Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin, LLP, 264 Ga.
App. 24, 26, 589 S.E.2d 840, 843 (2003)).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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court held that Martin could not have additional time to file his expert
affidavit, which effectively resulted in the dismissal of his lawsuit. 99
As a result of the decision in Scott, plaintiffs' lawyers should be wary
of the strict construction given to O.C.G.A. section 9-11-9.1 with regard
to the filing of an expert affidavit. Even in what appeared to be
extenuating circumstances, the court of appeals 200would not vary the
requirements or allow any leeway to the plaintiff.
VIII.

NEGLIGENCE

Broun, 0 1

In Halligan v.
Halligan sued Broun for injuries sustained
in an accident that resulted from Broun running a red light. Broun died
during the pendency of the litigation, and his co-executor was substituted as defendant.0 2 The trial court granted summary judgment to
Broun, concluding that although Broun was negligent
per se for running
203
the red light, he did so due to an "'act of God.'"
The undisputed facts showed that Broun, who was eighty-five years
old, ran a red light and struck Halligan's vehicle. 0 4 Prior to entering
the intersection, Broun "passed out or lost consciousness." 25 Broun
had never lost consciousness in the past and was told by his physician
that he had apparently suffered a severe drop in blood pressure; the
condition resulted in Broun having a pacemaker implanted.2 6
Halligan asserted that the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment for Broun because Broun was negligent per se in running the
light. He argued that requiring an intentional act in a negligence per
se situation
would give negligence a greater weight than negligence per
7
se.

20

In affirming the trial court, the court of appeals noted that negligence
per se does not constitute liability per se because negligence in and of
itself is only one of the prerequisites to a cause of action.08 If the sole
and proximate cause of an automobile accident is an act of God outside

199. Id., 633 S.E.2d at 667.
200. See id.
201. 285 Ga. App. 226, 645 S.E.2d 581 (2007).

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id. at 226, 645 S.E.2d at 582.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Herrin v. Peeches Neighborhood Grill & Bar, Inc., 235 Ga. App. 528,
533, 509 S.E.2d 103, 107-08 (1998)).
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of the defendant's control, a defendant can obtain summary judgment in
his or her favor even if he or she was negligent per se.2 °9
The court noted that according to O.C.G.A. section 1-3-3,21 ° "an 'act
of God' [is] 'an accident produced by physical causes which are irresistible or inevitable, such as .. .illness."'21' Therefore, if a driver suffers
an unforeseeable illness that causes him to lose control of his vehicle,
"'the driver's loss of control is not negligent, and he is not liable for any
damages caused by the out-of-control automobile.' ' 212 A driver must
show the "loss of consciousness produced the accident without any
contributing negligence on his part."213
In the case at bar, Halligan failed to produce any specific facts to
rebut the act of God defense. 214 Accordingly, Broun was entitled to
summary judgment despite the fact that he was negligent per se in
running the red light.2 15
Halligan is an interesting case because, not only was the defendant
able to assert the act of God defense, but he was also able to actually
obtain summary judgment based on the defense.216 Broun obtained
summary judgment because no evidence refuted the fact that he had no
history of passing out. 217 However, it is generally accepted by practitioners that the act of God defense is rarely successful.
In light of the decision in Halligan and in order to survive summary
judgment, plaintiff's counsel would be well advised to either (1) scour the
defendant's medical records and history, or (2) perhaps obtain an expert
witness that can establish the defendant's contributory negligence in
driving while aware of the possibility that he may lose consciousness
while behind the wheel.218
Hudson v. Swain. 9 involved a nine-car collision where the defendant
was the last car in the line of cars, and the plaintiff was the third car in

209. Id.
210. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-3 (2000 & Supp. 2007).
211. Halligan, 285 Ga. App. at 226-27, 645 S.E.2d at 582 (emphasis added by court)
(quoting O.C.G.A. 1-3-3(3)).
212. Id. at 227, 645 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Lewis v. Smith, 238 Ga. App. 6, 7, 517
S.E.2d 538, 540 (1999)).
213. Id.
214. Id., 645 S.E.2d at 583.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. This is not to say that plaintiffs counsel in Halligan failed in any way to
competently pursue the case.
219. 282 Ga. App. 718, 639 S.E.2d 319 (2006).
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of the cars collided, but
the line. When traffic came to a stop, several
22 °
the parties disputed the order of collision.
In her motion for summary judgment, Swain contended that no
evidence existed in the record to show she caused the complained of
injuries. She admitted to hitting the car in front of her, which was five
cars behind the plaintiff, but claimed that her collision did not cause any
collision with the plaintiff's car which was six cars in front of her.221
The defendant based her motion for summary judgment on deposition
testimony from the plaintiff's family. The plaintiff's mother, a passenger
in the car, stated that while she knew the car behind her stopped, she
did not know about the cars behind that car or the defendant's car. The
plaintiff's father, the driver of the vehicle, stated that he did not know
how the accident occurred. The plaintiff himself also stated that he did
not know who hit whom or when, or whether Swain caused the
accident.222
In response to Swain's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff
filed an affidavit from his father and relied on affidavits from other
drivers involved in the collision (the drivers of the fourth and fifth cars
behind the plaintiff who were in the first two cars in front of the
defendant), as well as Swain's guilty plea for following too closely. The
affidavits from the other drivers did not state that Swain's car pushed
the cars in front of it into the plaintiff's car. Further, the plaintiff's
father's affidavit, prepared after his deposition, stated that he saw the
three vehicles in the back of the line of vehicles skidding toward the rest
of the vehicles. The affidavit also stated that the father observed the
position of the vehicles after the collision, which made it apparent that
the defendant and the drivers of the other two vehicles at the back of the
line were responsible for the accident.2 28
Affirming the denial of summary judgment, the court noted that the
mere fact of an accident's occurrence affords no basis for recovery absent
the plaintiff proving that the negligence of the defendant caused the
accident.224 Assuming Swain's guilty plea for following too closely
shows Swain breached the duty of care, in the absence of causation, the

220. Id. at 719, 639 S.E.2d at 320.
221. Id. The plaintiff initially filed suit against the drivers of the last three cars in the
line, but summary judgment was granted for the driver of the eighth car (the plaintiffs car
was third). Id. at 720 n.1, 639 S.E.2d at 321 n.1. In addition, the plaintiff could not prove
who caused the accident, and summary judgment was still pending for the driver of the
seventh car. Consequently, the plaintiff dismissed that case and re-filed it against Swain
only, who drove the last car in the line, several cars behind the plaintiff. Id.
222. Id. at 719-20, 639 S.E.2d at 320.
223. Id. at 720-21, 639 S.E.2d at 321.
224. Id. at 721, 639 S.E.2d at 321.
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plaintiff has no basis for recovery.2 " The court noted that the only
evidence suggesting Swain's negligence caused the accident was based
on the plaintiff's father's affidavit.2 26
However, the contradictory
testimony rule precluded his affidavit testimony because it directly
contradicted his deposition testimony. 227 Therefore, the evidence only
showed that a series of collisions occurred and that Swain caused one of
the collisions; however, no 22evidence indicated that Swain's actions
caused the plaintiff's injury. 1

225. Id.
226. Id. at 722, 639 S.E.2d at 322.
227. Id.
228. Id., 639 S.E.2d at 322-23.

